In October 2024, the UK official National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) and the Home Office convened the first Economic Crime Academic Forum, hosted by the Centre for Finance and Security, part of the defence think-tank the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The forum aimed to bridge the gap between academic research and policymaking by fostering dialogue and identifying actionable solutions to issues including money laundering, fraud, kleptocracy and corruption.
Three aspects of research on economic crime were covered: economic crime threats; response to economic crime in terms of policy, enforcement and evaluation; and research methods and associated challenges. Most of those attending agreed that ‘the threat landscape has become increasingly complex. Examples included the role of professional enablers, the emergence of professional money laundering networks and the development of new technologies’. A recurring theme was difficulty in obtaining reliable aggregate data; such as, the impact of fraud on businesses.
Language matters in the realm of fraud; terms such as ‘swindled’ may resonate with the public more effectively than ‘fraud’, which can feel impersonal. However, some expressed their concern that some language, such as ‘oligarchs’ to refer to ‘kleptocrats’, or representations of fraud in pop culture (such as documentaries on streaming services), can inadvertently glamorise crime. Fraud as crime can fail to resonate with the public, it was admitted.
High quality research leading to successful policy outcomes requires significant time and resources, which are not always available, the forum heard. lLimited funding led to competition between researchers, and some universities or research institutions become more focused on achieving tangible outputs (such as mentions of specific research in the media) rather than impacting policy. As it’s difficult to keep track of who is doing what, and when, that brings the risk of duplication of research. Research into sensitive topics can bring security questions; oligarchs and professional enablers may use ‘strategic litigation’ to silence journalists and academics.
While pockets of good communication do exist between academia and the government; there’s no formal model; hence interactions with government are more piecemeal or haphazard, prompted by personal connections and pre-existing collaborations.
As for how to proceed, randomised control trials have proven valuable in crime prevention, yet are less feasible for economic crime. Alternative approaches such as practitioner surveys, and anonymised data sharing (perhaps by banks for instance), were suggested. The UK government could consider encouraging financial institutions – which often conduct detailed impact assessments of interventions – to share their evaluations, which could enhance research and policy, or it could seek to include academics in initiatives such as the National Crime Agency (NCA) data fusion initiative, or UK Financial Intelligence Unit suspicious activity reports (SARs) analysis. In sum, the gathering found a strong desire for collaboration between the government, institutions, law enforcement and academia, to create meaningful impact; but how to act, to make change for the better?
For the full nine-page report on the forum, visit the RUSI website.
